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U.S. POLICY BLAMED

Dviet SALT Dilemma

By Oswald Johnston Star News Start Witter

YALTA, USSR — The sharp split within the U.S. government on how to negotiate an arms limitation deal at the Nixon-Brezhnev summit has presented the Russian leadership with a policy dileruna which may make any significant SALT agreement impossible.

Soviet officials here admit privately that a comprehensive strategic arms limitation agreement at this summit is out of reach. Secretary of State Henry A. Rissinger has for several weeks ruled out a permanent treaty as "impossible."

But since the start of the current

Rut since the start of the current trip, Kissinger has pushed vigorously and publicly for presidential backing for some kind of half-way agreement: Specifically, one that would slow down the headlong Soviet rush toward installing multiple warheads (MIRVs) on most of their long-range missiles.

At a news conference in Brussels last Wednesday, the eve of the departure for Moscow, Kissinger bluntly declared it President Nixon's "duty" to act decisively on arms control no matter what "controversy" it would provoke in Washington.

THIS STRONG advocacy was coupled with a sherp and scornful counterattack against Kissinger's toughest adversaries on arms control, the Pentagon and Sen. Henry M. Jackson D-Wash. Taken together, the performance seemed clearly designed to press Nizon into a poli-


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my position on SALT that would back the Kissinger view and repudiate the Pentagon view.

At the same time, Kissinger was

just as clearly sending a message to the Russians, inviting them to rework their bargaining offer on the MIRV issue which the Americans had rejected as unacceptable back in March.

See SALT. A.



Soviet leader Brezinev makes a point talking with President Nixon in a Velta garden. (Story on Page A-2).

From conversations here ith Soviet officials - midress the general lines of wel but in a position to ex-Continued from Page A-1

n capsule their reasoning is But it is equally clear that he Soviet leadership is not uite sure how to respond. S follows: inderstood. ears certain that the mesage has been received and

SINCE Communist leader conid I. Brezhnev has

American Purge, one Soyiel official called it.
Accordingly, there is fear it
of negotiating any arms &
agreement that would have co nade a full commitment to letente—with the United in tee, the tendency is to ide with Kissinger against the arms control skeptica, who are denounced almost laily in the Soylet press.

But officials also coopings that Nixon is in serious political trouble back home, damaged by Watergate and facing impeachment. "The great Accordingly, some Soviet officials have been trying to slaw drown the push toward a MIRV compromise Kissinger has been sponsoring. They are urging instead that the negotiators settle for a general declaration of and specific agreement. of the final summit commu-nique, rather than a hard intention, perhaps a section

But a mere "statement of intent" on SALT, full of generalities and few real commitments .. reapons,

proval and, in the present political climate, possible defeat. The Arms Control

defeat. The Arms Control Soviet posture of alociness and Disarmament Act reports of proval for any agreement proval for any agreement. Risalinger is now embruised for that we position of their en—the arms issue only to party chairman, but it is the makes the Soviet position as a filicials close to Kissinger's the Soviet position and officials close to Kissinger's waitinging deals with a president provided the special of pass fatally, but Brezhner in the perpetual power dent who might be impeached in a struggle of Soviet political. ed, because the Kremlin cia

In its crudest terms, the Watergale uncasiness lakes this form: Be careful of signing deals with a president who might be impeached, because the Kramilin hawks could then pounce on the policy of detents with a discredited leader. This attitude, ever so subtly was reflected in Pravid da Komission of the world illustration of the world in personal when intreasible the world in the world da interest to future relations between the two nations.

who now worries about the

Kreminologists nere

Cressing. ing an outery against a "cosmetic" and meaning-less bit of summit windowdamage detents by provo manimous that the off tal

ing for demestic consumption, even though Tiss director and government spokesman Leonid Zam 16 tin, demes it categoric lly denounced the Am ri-

an reporter who raised the may spate of rumors about a point.

By point.

MORE generally, he and Nixon.

MORE generally, he should of the theorizing fo we cake the view that detan, is whether Kissinger—his to important to be upset by position in the administrative in such things as Waterg to, thon weakened by his petronal there is no doubt that lant threat to quit during the Kissinger—himself would his Salzburg news conference with them on that any overreached himself as mil pass," one Soviet offi-cial observed. "After II, at Brussels when he tried to push Nimn along on SALT? The speculation took the form of full-blown theory in

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Continued from Page A-1

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Soviet posture of alcofness on Nixon's domestic troubles, the summit negotiators have to take them into account. And the fact that Kissinger is now embroiled makes the Soviet position more difficult. in a bruising policy dispute en the arms issue DESPITE the official

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